[Statlist] Research seminar in statistics December 4th 2015, GSEM University of Geneva

[Eva Cantoni]

Organisers :
E. Cantoni - D. La Vecchia - E. Ronchetti -
S. Sperlich - F. Trojani - M-P. Victoria-Feser

Friday December 4th, 2015 at 11h15 - Room M 5220, Uni Mail (40, bd du 
Pont-d'Arve)

The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British 
Commutations During World War I

Daniel Chen
Institute for Advanced Studies, Toulouse School of Economics and Labor 
and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School

ABSTRACT:
During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers 
to death, but only executed 12%; the others received commuted sentences. 
Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted 
sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular 
case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially a 
random, “pitiless lottery.”

Using a dataset on all capital cases during World War I, I statistically 
investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an 
essentially random process. Using this result, I exploit variation in 
commutations and executions within military units to identify the 
deterrent effect of executions, with deterrence measured by the elapsed 
time within a unit between the resolution of a death sentence (i.e., a 
commutation or execution) and subsequent absences within that unit.

Absences are measured via handwritten trial records and “wanted” lists 
prepared by British military police units searching for deserters and 
preserved in war diaries and police gazettes. I find some limited 
evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing 
Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly 
Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of 
authority affects why people obey the law.


Visit the website: http://www.stat-center.unige.ch/ressem.html


Karen Longden Roure
Program Coordinator
MSc. in Management, MSc. in Economics, MSc. in Statistics
Université de Genève, Uni-Mail
Faculté d'Economie & Management, GSEM
40, bd. du Pont d'Arve, 1211 Genève 4
Tél:  +41.22.379.8109 (10h-14h)


-- 
Prof. Eva Cantoni
Research Center for Statistics and
  Geneva School of Economics and Management
University of Geneva, Bd du Pont d'Arve 40, CH-1211 Genève 4
gsem.unige.ch/rcs/cantoni